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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j)(1991). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE I: Is governmental immunity waived for the negligent 
acts of a government inspector which occur while said inspector is 
conducting an inspection for the government? Since this issue is 
a question of law, no particular deference is given to the trial 
court's ruling, but it is reviewed for correctness. City of Logan 
v. Utah Power & Light Co., 796 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1990). 
ISSUE II: Does the Liability Reform Act of 1986, Utah Code 
Ann. SS 78-27-37, et seq. (1987), preclude an injured party's 
employer, who is not a party to the action, from being named upon 
a special verdict form for the purpose of apportioning fault? This 
issue also presents a question of law and therefore the trial 
court's ruling should be reviewed for correctness. City of Logan, 
796 P.2d at 699. 
1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following Statutes are reproduced in full and can be found 
in the Appendix to this brief, Exhibit 2. 
1. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act or 
omission of employee — Exception. Utah Code Ann. § 63-
30-10(4)(1991).1 
2. Exclusive remedy against employer, or officer, agent or 
employee — Occupational disease excepted. Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-60 (1987). 
3. Utah Liability Reform Act: Definitions. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 73-27-37(1991). 
4. Comparative negligence. Utah Code Ann. §73-27-38(1991). 
5. Separate special verdicts on total damages and proportion 
of fault. Utah Code Ann. § 73-27-39(1991). 
6. Amount of liability limited to proportion of fault — No 
contribution. Utah Code Ann. § 73-27-40(1991). 
7. Joinder of defendants. Utah Code Ann. § 73-27-41(1991). 
8. Release to one defendant does not discharge other 
defendants. Utah Code Ann. § 73-27-42(1991). 
10. Effect on immunity, exclusive remedy, indemnity, 
contribution. Utah Code Ann. § 73-27-43(1991). 
1
 formerly § 63-30-10(1)(d). 
2 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
James D. Ericksen, plaintiff, appellee and cross-appellant 
(hereinafter "Ericksen") brought this action in the Third Judicial 
District Court to recover compensation for injuries he sustained 
while working on a maintenance building at the Salt Lake City 
International Airport. (R. at 2-5) Defendants Salt Lake City 
Corporation and Salt Lake Airport Authority (hereinafter "Salt 
Lake") filed a third party claim against Ericksen1s employer, 
Projects Unlimited (hereinafter "Projects"), seeking indemnity 
under its contract with Projects. (R. at 62-69) 
Ericksen fell from a ladder while high above the ground when 
Salt Lake City Construction Inspector, Millard Rice (hereinafter 
"Rice"), negligently raised an electric overhead door against which 
Ericksenvs ladder was resting. The overhead door dislodged 
Ericksenvs ladder causing him to fall several feet to a cement 
floor. Ericksen sustained a serious injury to his lower back. (R. 
at 289 pp. 10-11) 
On March 4, 1991, both Salt Lake and Projects were heard on 
cross-motions for summary judgment. The substance of these motions 
was to determine whether Projects had indemnified Salt Lake for the 
negligent acts of Rice, an employee of Salt Lake, pursuant to a 
written contract between the parties. (R. at 100-124) The trial 
court denied Salt Lake's motion for summary judgment and granted 
Projects' motion for summary judgment which dismissed Projects from 
the lawsuit. (R. at 181) 
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A three day jury trial took place on March 5, 6, and 7, 1991. 
After the close of the evidence, a special verdict form was 
presented to the jury. (See Addendum to this brief, Exhibit 1) 
The trial court allowed the special verdict form to include 
Projects for purposes of proportioning fault even though Projects 
was no longer a party to the action and had been deleted from the 
caption. The jury found that Ericksen, Salt Lake and Projects were 
all negligent and that their negligence had proximately caused 
Ericksenfs injuries which amounted to $186,200. (R. at 195-98) 
The jury apportioned 10% of the fault to Ericksen, 50% of the fault 
to Salt Lake, and 40% of the fault to Projects. (R. at 197) 
The trial court entered judgment on the special verdict 
against Salt Lake and in favor of Ericksen in the amount of 
$94,892. This figure represents the proportion of Salt Lake's 
fault (50%) times Ericksenfs total injuries of $186,200 plus 
prejudgment interest on the special damages awarded. (R. 266-72) 
Subsequently, Salt Lake filed its notice of appeal (R. 275-76), and 
Ericksen filed his cross appeal (R. 277-79). 
Statement of Facts 
Ericksen was injured on March 5, 1987, when he fell from a 
ladder while completing a task assigned to him by his employer, 
Projects. Rice, the City's Construction Inspector, negligently 
raised an electric overhead door against which Ericksenfs ladder 
was resting. The movement of the overhead door caused Ericksen to 
fall several feet to a cement floor causing severe injury to his 
lower back. (R. 289, pp. 4-11) 
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Salt Lake moved for summary judgment against Ericksen claiming 
that Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(4), formerly § 63-30-10(1)(d), 
created an exception to the waiver of governmental immunity in 
cases where the injury was caused by the negligence of a 
government-employed inspector in the course of his duties. This 
argument was rejected by the trial court and the motion was denied. 
(R. 32-56). 
Salt Lake then joined the general contractor, Projects, which 
was Ericksenvs employer, as a third-party defendant, for indemnity 
between Projects and Salt Lake. (R. 62-69). On March 4, 1991, the 
day before trial, both Salt Lake and Projects were heard on cross-
motions for summary judgment. The substance of these motions was 
to determine whether Projects had indemnified Salt Lake for the 
negligent acts of a Salt Lake building inspector. (R. at 100-124) 
The trial court ruled in favor of Projects' motion for summary 
judgment thus dismissing Projects from the lawsuit. (R. at 181) 
The action was tried before a jury on March 5-7, 1991, and a 
verdict was reached awarding total damages of $186,200 to Ericksen, 
with the liability apportioned 10% to Ericksen, 50% to Salt Lake 
and 40% to Projects. The trial court entered judgment against Salt 
Lake City for 50% of the damages plus costs and interest on the 
special damages. (R. 266-269) Salt Lake appealed the trial 
court's judgment claiming that it was immune from suit under an 
exception to Utah's Governmental Immunity waiver provision and that 
Projects had expressly agreed to indemnify Salt Lake. (See Salt 
Lake's Appeal Brief, at pp. 6-15) Ericksen filed a cross-appeal 
5 
alleging error occurred when the trial court permitted Projects 
name to be included on the special verdict form for fault 
apportionment purposes. (R. 277-79 and Ericksenfs Docketing 
Statement filed with this court, p. 4) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON CROSS APPEAL 
Ericksen requests the Court to affirm the trial court's ruling 
that found Salt Lake was not immune from suit for the negligent 
acts of its own building inspector. Ericksen further requests that 
the Court modify the trial court's judgment so that the fault 
attributed to Projects, the immune employer, is shared 
proportionately between Ericksen and Salt Lake as is required by 
the Utah's Liability Reform Act. Ericksen also requests that the 
Court rule that he is not required to reimburse Projects or 
Projects workers' compensation insurance carrier for the benefits 
paid in his behalf until such time that said benefits exceed the 
dollar value (Ericksenvs 1/6 share of the damages $31,033.33 less 
his actual fault of 10% or $18,620.00 equals $12,413.33, Ericksenfs 
proportionate share of Projects fault) of Ericksenfs proportionate 
share of Projects fault. Ericksen further requests that 
reimbursement is only required for the value of benefits that 
exceed his proportionate share ($12,413.33) of Projects fault. 
In the alternative, if the court finds that Ericksen should 
shoulder the entire share of Projects fault, it is hereby requested 
that the Court rule that Ericksen is not required to reimburse 
Projects or Projects workers' compensation insurance carrier for 
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benefits paid in his behalf until such time that said benefits 
exceed the 40% fault or $74,480,00 attributed to Projects. And in 
such event, reimbursement is only required to the extent such 
benefits exceed the $74,480.00 attributed to Projects. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
LACK OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY: Governmental immunity has been 
waived by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 which provides that immunity is 
waived "for injury proximately caused by a negligent act" of a 
government employee. Sub-section (4) of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 
does not provide an exception to this waiver for the acts of an 
inspector in the course of the inspection, but rather only retains 
immunity for an inspection which was not done or which was 
inadequately or negligently done. The trial court's ruling finding 
that Salt Lake was not immune from this suit should be affirmed. 
APPORTIONMENT OF AN IMMUNE NON-PARTIES FAULT IS IMPROPER: 
Under Utah's Liability Reform Act, fault comparison involving 
immune persons and entities who are not parties to the action is 
inappropriate and constitutes error. When immune parties are 
involved, the Liability Reform Act requires that all parties 
seeking recovery combined with all non-immune defendants share the 
burden of the immune party's fault proportionately according to 
their own respective shares of the fault. Here, the trial court 
committed error when it required Ericksen to shoulder the entire 
burden of the immune party's share of the fault. Consequently, 
Ericksen requests the Court to modify the trial court's ruling so 
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that the parties involved share proportionately the burden of an 
immune participant as is required by statute and to make a further 
ruling that Ericksen not be required to reimburse Projects or 
Projects workers' compensation insurance carrier for any benefits 
paid that are valued at less than the proportionate share of the 
fault attributed to Projects. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
JANES D. ERICKSENfS CLAIM AGAINST SALT LAKE 
CITY AND SALT LAKE AIRPORT IS NOT BARRED BY 
UTAH'S GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
It is widely recognized that governments generally are 
protected to a large extent by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
In Utah, immunity is provided by the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act, found at § 63-30-1 et seq. of Utah Code Annotated. In the 
present case, however, appellant's reliance on the provisions of 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act is misplaced, 
A. THE LANGUAGE OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10(4) DOES 
NOT APPLY TO NEGLIGENT ACTS OF AN INSPECTOR 
Appellant argues that Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(4) should 
apply to preserve governmental immunity for Salt Lake. But 
appellant's reading of the statute seems somewhat strained. The 
statute provides that the government waives immunity "for injuries 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment." (Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10). The 
government limits its waiver by making several exceptions where 
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waiver does not apply. Appellant erronously claims that immunity 
is preserved with respect to the instant action using sub-section 
(4) of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 as support. Sub-section (4) 
preserves immunity where injury results from Ma failure to make an 
inspection or by making an inadequate or negligent inspection." 
(Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(4)) 
It is evident that the purpose of sub-section (4) of Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-10 is to allow inspectors of government sponsored 
projects to complete their work without fear that an oversight 
which later causes injuries will give rise to liability for the 
government. As appellant correctly notes, M[t]he best promotion of 
protection to the Utah public is to encourage thorough inspections 
to disclose defects and inadequate workmanship and correct them." 
(Appellant's Brief at 15.) The valid and necessary government 
function of completing inspections of all types is furthered by 
allowing inspections to go on without the results of the 
inspections being second-guessed by courts and juries. In the 
absence of the protection of immunity, every injury caused by or on 
government owned property would give rise to a potential cause of 
action for failure to inspect, inadequate inspection, or negligent 
inspection. The resulting factual inquiries could be limitless. 
The legislature attempted to avoid this endless pit of future 
litigation by creating a statute which preserves immunity for an 
inspection completed on behalf of a governmental entity. 
Appellant notes, though, that the statute seems to contain two 
somewhat similar words, "inadequate" and "negligent". The argument 
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made by appellant is summarized as follows: if the statute is read 
so that both words apply to the inspection done, rather than the 
former applying to the inspection itself and the latter to the acts 
of the inspector, the statute would violate the principle of 
statutory interpretation that a statute should be construed so that 
all words have purpose. (Appellant's Brief at 11-13.) 
This argument fails, however, when the sub-section is read as 
a whole. The statutory scheme of U.C.A § 63-30-10(4) provides 
complete coverage for three possible deficiencies in an inspection, 
which are: (1) That the inspection was not done at all; (2) that 
it was done inadequately; or (3) that it was done negligently. The 
later two categories are distinct and foresee two separate types of 
"wrongfulM inspection. 
An inspection which was done inadequately would be one which 
was done in such a cursory or superficial manner that important 
items to be inspected which should have been inspected were missed. 
A negligently done inspection, on the other hand, would be one in 
which all the necessary inspection was done, but, because of a lack 
of due care, some defect in the work was not seen or was 
misdiagnosed. 
The facts of this case do not reveal an inspection which was 
inadequate or negligent, which subsequently caused an injury. 
Rather, the negligent act of the inspector in the course of the 
inspection caused the injury. The statute in question, Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-10(4), should not be stretched to allow the government 
to be immune from suit for the negligent act of its agent, even 
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where the agent was conducting an inspection at the time of the 
negligent act. 
B. THE STATUTE AT ISSUE SHOULD BE CONSTRUED SO AS TO 
SERVE THE INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE, AND THE COURT 
SHOULD NOT ADD MEANING TO THE STATUTE 
Appellant attempts to marshal a rule of statutory construction 
in support of its argument. This court has responded to an earlier 
attempt to inappropriately apply a general rule of statutory 
construction by stating, "helpful as rules of construction often 
are, they are useful guides, but poor masters; and they should not 
be regarded as having any such rigidity as to have the force of 
law, or distort an otherwise natural meaning or intent." Salt Lake 
City v. Salt Lake County, 568 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1977). 
Appellant chooses one rule of statutory construction and attempts 
to rigidly apply it here as a shield. This court has also stated 
"that a statute should not be construed in a piecemeal fashion but 
as a comprehensive whole." Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 
1037, 1045 (Utah 1991). 
As noted above, the Mnatural meaning or intent" of Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-10(4), when the sub-section is viewed in its entirety, 
and in conjunction with the rest of the statute, seems to be a 
thorough attempt by the legislature to foreclose any argument of 
liability by reason of the inspection itself, whether the 
inspection was not done, was inadequately done, or was negligently 
done. There is no evidence of an attempt to protect the government 
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from liability when an inspector's personal negligent acts cause 
injury* 
It is instructive, in this inquiry, to look to other sub-
sections of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(4) in an effort to gain 
insight into the intent of the legislators. As this Court has 
stated, M[i]f there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or 
application of an act, it is appropriate to analyze the act in its 
entirety, in the light of its objective.M Osula v. Aetna Life & 
Casualty, 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980). 
For example, sub-sections (8), (9) and (18) of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-10, which not presently relevant in themselves, are helpful 
for comparison as to how sub-section (4) could have been written if 
the legislature had intended the result which appellants here 
urges. Appellant urges a broad immunity for all acts of government 
inspectors while working for the government. Sub-sections (8), (9) 
and (18) of the statute in dispute say that immunity is not waived 
for injury that is caused: (8) ... in connection with the 
collection or assessment of taxes; [or in] (9) the activities of 
the Utah National Guard.M Similarly, the last sub-section of the 
statute in question here explicitly does not waive governmental 
immunity for "(18) the activities of: (a) providing emergency 
medical assistance; [and] (b) fighting fire." (Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-10(18)). 
The preceding sub-sections of the statute in question reveal 
that the legislature clearly knew how to provide blanket immunity 
for the acts of certain government agents, such as tax collection 
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employees, the Utah National Guard and emergency crews. If the 
legislature had desired such all-inclusive coverage for inspectors, 
sub-section (4) would certainly have been worded differently. Sub-
section (4) could say, for instance, that immunity would be 
preserved for "negligent acts of inspectors" or simply, as in sub-
section (8), "in connection with or as a result of an inspection". 
A thorough reading of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(4) reveals a 
telling absence of specific language covering the acts of 
inspectors. This Court has stated that a corollary to the 
statutory construction rule upon which appellant relies is the 
principle that "[f]or the same reasons, the omissions should 
likewise be taken note of and given effect." Kennecott Copper 
Corporation v. Anderson, 514 P.2d 217, 219 (Utah 1973). In the 
present case, there is a lack of words to support appellant's 
argument, and the argument should, therefore, be rejected. 
C. SOUND POLICY SUPPORTS THE HOLDING THAT FINDS GOVERNMENT 
LIABLE FOR THE NEGLIGENT ACTS OF ITS INSPECTORS 
Appellant attempts, finally, to make policy justifications in 
support of the argument that the government should be free of 
liability for the negligent acts of inspectors on the job. 
(Appellant's Brief at 13-15.) Certainly there are sound policy 
reasons for the statute in dispute here, as mentioned above, but 
the policy arguments do not extend to immunity of the government 
for any act of an inspector acting on fcehalf of the government. 
When taken to its logical limit, the policy-based argument is 
absurd. Should an inspector working for the government be allowed 
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to negligently toss a burning cigarette butt in the area of 
explosives, killing numerous people and causing immense property 
damage? Would this act, perhaps more negligent than the one at 
issue here and more tenuously connected to the actual inspection 
than the negligent act in the present case, be immune from 
liability? Another example might involve an inspector driving a 
truck from one part of the job site to another. If he negligently 
injures a worker due to his failure to drive with due care, is the 
government immune from liability under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
10(4)? Under appellant's argument, it seems, clearly negligent 
acts of an inspector such as these would not open the government to 
liability because they were performed by an inspector in the course 
of his employment for the government, but such acts would not 
further "thorough inspections" as appellant argues. (Appellant's 
Brief at 15.) Similarly, in the instant case the negligent act of 
the inspector as he conducted his inspection does not further the 
legitimate policy of complete and thorough inspections. 
The argument that acts of inspectors should be covered by Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-10(4) falls short in the examples described 
above. It becomes clear that the acts of the inspector, for which 
the government should be liable, must be distinguished from the 
results of the inspection itself, which must never subject the 
government to liability, under the terms of the statute. It is a 
valid policy which preserves immunity for inspections: (1) which 
should have been done but were not, or (2) which were done 
inadequately, that is to say insufficiently, or (3) which were 
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negligently done, thereby failing to reveal dangerous defects or 
conditions which subsequently cause injury and/or damage. This 
protection should not be extended by this Court to include immunity 
for negligent acts while the inspector just happens to be on the 
job for the government. Appellant's argument asking this Court to 
expand the government's immunity in this regard should be denied 
and the trial court's ruling regarding this issue should be 
affirmed. 
POINT II. 
UTAH'S LIABILITY REFORM ACT PRECLUDES ANY 
APPORTIONMENT OF FAULT TO PLAINTIFF'S FORMER 
EMPLOYER, PROJECTS UNLIMITED 
Under Utah's Liability Reform Act of 1986, Utah Code Ann. §§ 
78-27-37, et seq. (1989), fault comparison involving immune persons 
and entities who are not parties to the action is inappropriate. 
In the instant case, the trial court allowed the jury to apportion 
a percentage of the fault to an immune non-party. To make matters 
worse, the trial court deducted all of the immune non-party's fault 
from the plaintiff's recovery instead of spreading it 
proportionately among the named parties as is required by the 
Liability Reform Act. Here, the trial court committed error when 
it assumed jurisdiction over the immune non party for fault 
comparison and judgment reduction purposes when in fact no such 
jurisdiction exists. Ericksen hereby respectfully requests the 
Court to modifying the trial court's judgment so that the fault 
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attributed to Projects is shared proportionately by Ericksen and 
Salt Lake according to their proportionate share of the fault. 
A. RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DEMONSTRATE 
THAT THE LIABILITY REFORM ACT PRECLUDES ANY 
APPORTIONMENT OF PROJECTS FAULT 
This court has held that separate parts of an act should not 
be considered in isolation from the rest of the act* See Jensen v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903 (Utah 1984). Utah's 
Liability Reform Act includes sections 37 through 43 of Title 78, 
Chapter 27. Section 37 defines the terms to be used in the act and 
Section 39 directs the court on what should be included on a 
special verdict form. 
Section 78-27-37(1) defines "Defendant" to mean "any person 
not immune from suit who is claimed to be liable because of fault 
to any person seeking recovery." Consequently, before a person can 
be considered a "Defendant" under the act, that person must not be 
immune from suit. Here, Projects can't possibly be considered a 
defendant under the act because it is immune from suit under the 
exclusive remedy provision of Utah's Workers' Compensation Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60 (1989). The exclusive remedy provision 
specifically states that "no action at law may be maintained 
against an employer or against any officer, agent or employee of 
the employer based upon any accident, injury or death of an 
employee." Id. at § 35-1-60. 
Projects only liability is statutory and not based upon fault. 
Utah's Workers' Compensation Act is designed to provide 
compensation to injured employees regardless of fault. See 
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Oliveras v. Caribou-Four Corners, Inc., 598 P.2d 1320, 1323 (Utah 
1979). Projects is required by statute to provide workers' 
compensation insurance coverage for it employees. In exchange for 
such requirement, the Utah legislature has declared employers 
immune from suit. Since Projects is immune from suit there is no 
way it may be considered a defendant under the act's definition of 
defendant. 
The fact that Projects is not a defendant is very important in 
light of section 78-27-39 of the Liability Reform Act. This 
statute allows the court to direct the jury "to find separate and 
special verdicts determining the total amount of damages sustained 
and the percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each 
person seeking recovery and to each defendant." Id. This statute 
makes it clear that only persons seeking recovery and "defendants" 
as defined in the Liability Reform Act are to be included on the 
special verdict form. In the instant action, Projects is neither 
a person seeking recovery or a defendant. Consequently, the 
plaintiff and defendants share the damages caused by the immune 
employer according to their fault vis-a-vis each other. 
Moreover, Judge David Winder of Utah's Federal District Court 
held that immune parties in Projects position can not be joined as 
additional defendants and "that any determination or allocation of 
their negligence will not be allowed to be determined by the jury 
at the time of trial." Smith v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. 
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Co., No. C-88-497W at p. 7 (D. Utah April 1989 ).2 The court was 
also of the opinion that it appeared anomalous that the enactment 
of Utah's Liability Reform Act and specifically section 78-27-38 
Utah Code Ann. would: 
effectuate the radical step of allowing such 
immune person's liability to be factored in to 
the determination of fault, thus permitting in 
some instances the amount to be recovered 
against a defendant to be significantly 
reduced, without some clear statement of that 
intention being found in the new law or in the 
legislative history leading to the enactment 
of that law. 
Id. Judge Winder spoke of the very situation present in the 
instant action. Here, Ericksen, was found to be only 10% at fault 
and yet he, in light of the trial court's allowance of Projects to 
be on the special verdict form, must bear the burden for 50% of his 
injuries. Projects should not have been included on the special 
verdict form and it was error to allow the jury to assess Projects 
proportion of the fault. 
This court has held that M [s]tatutory acts are to be so 
construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful." 
Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980). 
Section 78-27-40 of the Utah Code provides that the maximum amount 
for which a defendant may be liable is that "percentage or 
proportion of the damages equivalent to the percentage or 
proportion of fault attributed to that defendant.ff Id. But, the 
^ Several of Utah's Courts, both State and Federal, have dealt with the issue in question and 
have rendered varying decisions. In light of the conflicting decisions. Judge Thomas Green of Utah's 
Federal District Court has certified the issue to this Court for resolution on at least two separate 
cases. See Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. of Utah, Civil No. 87-C-330G (D. Utah October 1991) and 
Gmes v. Ingersoll-Rand, Civil No. 89-C-543G (D. Utah November 1991). 
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second sentence of section 40 specifically states that "[n]o 
defendant is entitled to contribution from any other person." Id. 
Under the trial court's allowance of Projects to be on the special 
verdict form the second sentence of section 40 is meaningless 
because a defendant would never be liable for more than his or her 
proportionate share. However, if section 40 is construed to render 
all parts relevant and meaningful, the second sentence specifically 
addresses what happens if the jury does not assess an immune 
employer's proportion of fault. 
If the immune employer, Projects, is not included in the 
assessment of fault, Salt Lake whose liability is assessed may pay 
more than if Projects fault were considered. In the instant 
matter, the jury found that Ericksenvs damages equalled a dollar 
figure of $186,200.00. Based upon the jury's assessment of fault 
and not taking into consideration interest on special damages, 
Ericksen is responsible for (10% * 186,200) $18,620.00; Salt Lake 
is responsible for (50% * 186,200) $93,100.00; and Projects is 
responsible for (40% * 186,200) $74,480.00. If, however, Projects 
fault was not assessed and the damages were apportioned among 
Ericksen and Salt Lake, Ericksen would be responsible for (10%/60% 
or 1/6 * 186,200) $31,033.33 and Salt Lake would pick up the 
balance (50%/60% or 5/6 * 186,200) $155,166.67.3 In the second 
J
 Since the jury did factor in the fault of Ericksen's immune employer Projects, the parties 
responsible for 60% of the fault must share the burden of the additional 40% proportionately to their 
respective shares of the total fault. Here, 1/6 represents Ericksen's share of the total fault and 
5/6 represents Salt Lake's share of the fault when the parties are assessed proportionately their 
share of the fault attributed to Projects, the immune non-party. Obviously, if the statute is 
applied as Ericksen contends that it should be, the jury would have to be instructed that the named 
parties have the obligation to share the burden of the immune non-party and that the juries 
apportionment should reflect this shared burden in proportion to the parties respective shares of 
the fault. 
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situation were the parties share the burden of the immune party 
Salt Lake would have incentive to seek contribution from Projects. 
However, this is the very situation contemplated in the second 
sentence of section 40 which prohibits Salt Lake from proceeding 
against Projects. 
The second sentence of section 40 is very relevant and 
meaningful in the context of the instant case. Utah's Legislature 
contemplated and prepared for the situation where an immune 
tortfeasor is involved. The trial court failed to apply the 
Liability Reform Act as it was meant to be applied thus causing 
Ericksen to shoulder far more than his proportionate share of the 
fault. 
B. UTAH'S LIABILITY REFORM ACT WAS DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE 
A COMPROMISE BETWEEN COMPETING INTERESTS 
The primary objective of Utah's Liability Reform Act was to 
correct the perceived inequities with the doctrine of Joint and 
Several Liability. However, as is evident from the Act, the 
legislature did not avoid dealing with the various competing 
interests involved. 
Prior to Utah's Liability Reform Act, a minor joint tortfeasor 
bore the risk of paying the entire amount of the damages regardless 
of his or her percentage of fault. The Liability Reform Act 
completely shifted the risk of the "broke" or "impecunious" 
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tortfeasor to the plaintiff.4 However, the risk of the immune 
tortfeasor is shouldered by both the plaintiff and the non-immune 
tortfeasors in proportion to their respective faults as is evident 
by section 78-27-39 of the Utah Code and the second sentence of 
section 78-27-40 of the Utah Code.5 
In the instant matter it makes good sense to have the 
plaintiff and defendant share the burden of the immune tortfeasor 
in light of Utah's Workers1 Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 35-
1-1, et seq. (1991). Section 35-1-62 of the Utah Code requires the 
injured employee to reimburse his or her employer for all benefits 
paid under workers' compensation from the proceeds of the 
employee's third party claim. For example, in the instant action, 
the jury valued Ericksen?s injuries at $186,200.00. From this 
amount, 10% was deducted reflecting the fault attributed to 
Ericksen and 40% was deducted reflecting the amount attributed to 
Projects. Ericksenvs amount after these deductions with interest 
equalled $94,892.00. From this amount, pursuant to Utah's Workers' 
Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62, Ericksenvs recovery is 
further reduced by the amount of benefits he has received to date 
from workers' compensation. 
4
 Impecunious tortfeasors, even though not named as a party to an action can arguably fit 
within section 78-27-37(1) of Utah's Liability Reform Act's definition of Defendant which is "any 
person not immune from suit who is claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking 
recovery." 
5
 Section 39 of the Liability Reform Act limits apportioning of the fault on a special verdict 
form to just those seeking recovery and defendants. Section 40*s second sentence shows that Utah's 
Legislature anticipated that in cases where immune parties were involved the named parties, both 
plaintiffs and defendants, would have to shoulder more than there actual contributing share of the 
fault. 
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To avoid this inequity of a double deduction, Utah's Liability 
Reform Act is designed to spread the burden of immune contributors 
of an injury to the actual parties listed in the action, both 
plaintiffs and defendants. The trial court's construction of the 
Liability Reform Act requires that Ericksen, the party least able, 
shoulder the entire burden of the fact that his employer is immune 
from suit. To make matters worse, Ericksen will then have to 
reimburse his employer or his employer's workers' compensation 
carrier for the benefits paid in his behalf from the 50% to be 
collected from Salt Lake. This result in incongruous with logic 
and fairness in light of the fact that the benefits paid in 
Ericksenfs behalf don't come close to approaching the $74,480.00 
worth of damage attributed to Projects. 
The correct application of Utah's Liability Reform Act is to 
spread the risk of immune tortfeasors among the remaining parties 
in proportion to their respective faults. This result is 
consistent with Indiana's statutory system which was amended to 
exclude a plaintiff's employer from those non-parties whose fault 
can be considered by the jury in the apportionment. In Hill v. 
Metropolitan Trucking, Inc., 659 F.Supp 430 (N.D. Ind. 1987) the 
court expounded on the reasons underlying the above described 
amendment by stating: 
Under the original version of Indiana's 
comparative fault law, a fault-free plaintiff 
suing a third party for injuries suffered in 
the course of his employment would have faced 
the prospect that the jury would apportion 
fault to the employer. Because the worker's 
compensation laws provide an exclusive remedy, 
the plaintiff could not recover the share of 
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his damages apportioned to his employer. 
Further, the employer could enforce his lien 
on the share of damage recovered from the 
third party, further reducing the plaintiff's 
recovery. The 1984 amendments cured this 
inequity by defining "nonparty" and excluding 
the claimant's employer. 
Id. at 433 (emphasis added). 
Utah's statute states that any recovery from a third party 
shall be first disbursed to pay the reasonable expenses of the 
action including attorneys fees. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62 (1991). 
Secondly, the party liable for making compensation payments, either 
the workers' compensation carrier or the employer itself, must be 
reimbursed prior to any monies going to the plaintiff for any and 
all benefits paid in behalf of the injured employee. Id. Like 
Indiana, Utah's Legislature has made a policy decision to disallow 
consideration of an immune employer's fault when a jury apportions 
fault. This decision eliminates an inequity which would otherwise 
result in a third party claim. It also strikes an equitable 
balance with the competing interests at play.6 
Consequently, Ericksen respectfully requests that the Court 
modify the trial court's judgment so that the fault attributed to 
Projects, the immune employer, is shared proportionately between 
Ericksen and Salt Lake as is required by the Liability Reform Act. 
Ericksen also requests that the Court rule that he is not required 
to reimburse Projects or Projects workers' compensation insurance 
carrier for the benefits paid in his behalf until such time that 
b
 The competing interests being the proponents of a complete ban on joint and several liability 
and those concerned with protecting the interests of the injured party. 
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said benefits exceed the dollar value (Ericksen's 1/6 share of the 
damages $31,033.33 less his actual fault of 10% or $18,620.00 
equals $12,413.33, Ericksen's proportionate share of Projects 
fault) of Ericksen's proportionate share of Projects fault. 
Ericksen further requests that reimbursement is only required for 
the value of benefits that exceed his proportionate share 
($12,413.33) of Projects fault. 
In the alternative, if the court finds that Ericksen should 
shoulder the entire share of Projects fault, he hereby requests 
that the Court rule that he is not required to reimburse Projects 
or Projects workers1 compensation insurance carrier for benefits 
paid in his behalf until such time that said benefits exceed the 
40% fault or $74,480.00 attributed to Projects. And in such event, 
reimbursement is only required to the extent such benefits exceed 
the $74,480.00 attributed to Projects. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Ericksen respectfully requests that 
the Court affirm the trial court's ruling that found Salt Lake NOT 
immune from suit for the negligent acts or conduct of one of its 
own building inspectors that occurred in the course of a government 
inspection. Ericksen, further requests pursuant to his cross-
appeal, that the trial court's judgment be modified so that the 
parties share the fault attributed to Projects in proportion to 
their respective shares of the fault as is required by Utah's 
Liability Reform Act. Ericksen also request that consideration be 
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given as described above for the inequities of reimbursing Projects 
pursuant to statute when benefits previously paid in EricksenTs 
behalf by his employer or his employer's insurance carrier equal a 
value far less than the value of fault attributed to Projects. 
In the alternative, if the Court finds Ericksen is responsible 
for both his and Projects proportionate share of the fault it is 
hereby requested that he be required to reimburse Projects or 
Projects workers' compensation insurance carrier only to the extent 
that those benefits paid in his behalf exceed the value of Projects 
fault or approximately $74,480.00. 
Respectfully submitted this _/<£_"llay of December, 1991. 
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN 
J. Craig^Swapp 
John Farrell Fay 
Attorneys for the James D. Ericksen 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the /* ^ day of 
December, 1991, four copies of James D. Ericksen's Appeal Brief 
were served by mail, postage fully prepaid to both Roger Bullock 
and Bruce Jones at the following addresses. 
Roger H. Bullock 
STRONG & HANNI 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Bruce T. Jones 
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG &fHANS0N 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
J. Craig S#app 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT 1 
TRIAL COURT'S RULINGS 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ERICKSEN, JAMES D. 
VS 
PLAINTIFF 
SALT LAKE CITY CORP. 
SALT LAKE AIRPORT AU DEFENDANT 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. SIEGFRIED, NED P 
D. ATTY. BULLOCK, ROGER H 
CASE NUMBER 880900637 PI 
DATE 01/05/89 
HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK CUG 
ON MOTION OF 
COURT. 
THIS CASE COMES NOW BEFORE THE COURT FOR RULING ON 
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. THEREFORE IT IS THE 
ORDER OF THE COURT THAT THE DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IS DENIED. THE COURT CONCLUDES THAT SECTION 63-30-10 
(D), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED WAS INTENDED TO DEAL WITH THE RESULTS 
OF AN INSPECTION INADEQUATELY CARRIED OUT OR NOT PERFORMED, AND 
NOT THE PHYSICAL MINISTERIAL WAY THE PHYSICAL INSPECTION WAS 
CARRIED OUT IN A PARTICULAR CASE. 
COURT ORDERS ATTORNEY SIEGFRIED TO SUBMIT AN APPROPRIATE 
ORDER FOR SIGNATURE. 
DATED: JANUARY 05, 1989 
CC: ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/ROGER H BULLOCK. 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF/NED P SIEGFRIED. 
FILE 
00054 
NED P. SIEGFRIED - #4141 
Attorney at Law 
136 East South Temple Street, #1060 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-0645 
HlEBDSJsilltCTCOUflT 
Third Judicial District 
JAN 1 0 1989 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES D. ERICKSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION 
and SALT LAKE AIRPORT 
AUTHORITY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C88-637 
Judge: Kenneth Rigtrup 
The Court having considered Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment in the above entitled matter and in connection 
therewith reviewed each party's Memoranda of Points and 
Authorities in regard to said Motion the Court; 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment is hereby denied. 
DATED this /fir day of January, 1989. 
BY THE URT: 
HONORABLE KENNETH RIGffRUP 
District Court Judge 
1 
RLE9 DISTRICT «»yRT 
Third Judicial District 
BRUCE T. JONES, ESQ. (#1732) 
CHARLES P. SAMPSON, ESQ. (#4658) 
of and for 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendant 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES D. ERICKSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION 
and SALT LAKE AIRPORT 
AUTHORITY, 
Defendants. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PROJECTS UNLIMITED, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
Third-Party Defendant Projects Unlimited, Inc. ("Pro-
jects"), brought a Motion for Summary Judgment on the Third-Party 
Complaint of Salt Lake City Corporation against Projects, request-
ing that the Court grant judgment in favor of Projects. Salt 
MAR 2 0 1991 
/ 1 SAUJ^KE COUNTY H I 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C88-637 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
GQ262 
Lake City Corporation brought a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment 
against Projects. 
Projects moved the Court on the grounds that the ex-
press language of the construction Agreement dated April 9, 1986, 
between the parties, and in particular ARTICLE 15 contained 
therein respecting indemnification, does not extend to allega-
tions of Salt Lake City's own negligence. Pursuant to Utah's 
Comparative Negligence provisions, the plaintiff can only recover 
from Salt Lake City in this action the amount of damages equiva-
lent to the proportion of fault attributable to Salt Lake City.^ 
As a consequence of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act,2 where 
the plaintiff has brought an action alleging negligence by Salt 
Lake City in a job-related injury, the potential liability of 
Projects (the former employer of plaintiff at the time of the 
injury) to Salt Lake City, if any, can only arise from a contract 
of indemnification wherein Projects clearly and unequivocally 
agrees to indemnify Salt Lake City from Salt Lake City's own 
negligence. Salt Lake City, and indirectly the plaintiff, cannot 
recover from Projects except where Projects has clearly and 
unequivocally waived the bar afforded Projects by the Workmen's 
Compensation Act. Salt Lake City cannot here maintain a third-
party action against Projects because there is no clear and 
1
 Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-40 (1986), as amended. 
2
 Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60 (1953), as amended. 
- 2 -
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unequivocal indemnification expressed in the Agreement between 
the parties whereby Projects indemnifies or agrees to defend 
Salt Lake City from Salt Lake City's own negligence. 
The Court having reviewed the Memorandum filed by the 
parties, considered the admissible evidence proffered by the 
parties, and heard the oral arguments of counsel at a hearing 
held on March 4, 1991, and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. The Motion for Summary Judgment of Third-Party 
Defendant Projects Unlimited, Inc. is granted, thereby dismissing 
the Third-Party Complaint of Salt Lake City with prejudice. 
The causes of action alleged in the Third-Party Complaint are 
barred by Utah's Workmen's Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 
35-1-60 (1953), as amended, there being no clear and unequivocal 
waiver of the bar expressed in the construction Agreement between 
the parties requiring Projects to indemnify or defend Salt Lake 
City from or against allegations of Salt Lake City's own negli-
gence . 
2. The Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment of Salt 
Lake City Corporation is denied. 
3. That judgment be, and hereby is, entered in favor 
of Third-Party Defendant Projects and against Third-Party Plain-
tiff Salt Lake City Corporation. 
- 3 -
(H) 
DATED this %0 day of March, 1991, 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT was mailed, 
postage prepaid, this /T(U day of March, 1991, to: 
Roger H. Bullock, Esq. 
STRONG & HANNI 
9 Exchange Place, #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Ned P. Siegfried, Esq. 
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN 
310 East 4500 South, #620 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
G»M3flftCfc*k»y. 
BTJ11.10 
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Third Judicial District 
APR 0 1 1991 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
JAMES D. ERICKSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION 
and SALT LAKE AIRPORT AUTHORITY 
CASE NO. C88-637 
JUDGEMENT ON 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
Defendants. 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
oooOooo 
This action came on regularly for trial on the 5th day of 
March, 1991 in Department 4 of the above entitled Court, the 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge presiding; 
That said parties appeared by their attorneys, John Farrell 
Fay, Counsel for Plaintiff and Roger Bullock, Counsel for" 
Defendant. A jury of eight persons was impaneled and sworn., 
i 
Witnesses were sworn and testified. After hearing the evidence and 
arguments of counsel, the jury was duly instructed by the Court and 
the cause was submitted to jury with directions to return a verdict 
OO;:GG 
on special issues. The jury deliberated and thereafter returned 
into court with its verdict consisting of the special issues 
submitted to the jury and the answers given thereto by the jury, 
which said verdict was in words and figures, as follows, to-wit: 
We, the jury in the above entitled action, find the following 
Special Verdict on the questions submitted to us: 
1. Was Salt Lake City Corporation negligent as forth in these 
instructions? 
Answer: Yes 
2. If so, was Salt Lake City's conduct a proximate cause of 
the accident to plaintiff James Ericksen? 
Answer: Yes 
If you have answered both of the above questions "yes" then 
please go on. If you have answered either of the above questions 
"no" you will not answer the remaining questions but will simply 
sign the verdict. 
That is, if you find that the defendant's conduct was not 
negligence which was a proximate cause of the accident, then simply 
sign the verdict form and inform the bailiff that you are done. On 
the other hand, if you find that the defendant's conduct was 
negligent and a proximate cause of the accident, then go on. 
3. Was plaintiff James Ericksen negligent as set forth in 
these instructions? 
2 
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Answer: Yes 
4. If so, was plaintiff James Ericksen's own conduct a 
proximate cause of the accident? 
Answer: Yes 
5. Was Projects Unlimited negligent as set forth in these 
instructions through the conduct of officers or employees other 
than James Ericksen? 
Answer: Yes 
£. If so, was Projects Unlimitedfs conduct a proximate cause 
of the accident? 
Answer: Yes 
7. Based upon a total percentage of 100%, set forth in the 
spaces below the percentage of negligence which proximately caused 
the accident which is attributable to each of the following. You 
should attribute percentages only to those parties which you have 
found guilty of negligence which proximately caused the accident in 
response to questions 1 through 6 above. 
Plaintiff James Ericksen 10% 
Defendant Salt Lake City 50% 
Projects Unlimited Inc. 40% 
TOTAL MUST BE 100% 
Note: If you attribute 50% or more of the negligence to 
plaintiff James Ericksen, you need not answer any further question. 
3 
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If you attribute less than 50% of the negligence to plaintiff James 
Ericksen, then answer the following questions: 
fc. What amount of damages, if any, do you find from a 
preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff sustained as a 
proximate result of the accident of March 5, 1987? 
Past medical expenses: $3,300,00 
Past lost wages: 7,900,00 
Future medical expenses, 
future lost earnings, pain, 
suffering, and other future 
damages: 175,000.00 
TOTAL: $186,200.00 
Dated this 7th day of March 1991. 
Karen Emerson 
Foreperson 
It appearing that by reason of said special verdict: 
That Plaintiff James D. Ericksen is entitled to Judgement in 
the amount of *7Vy fflZ—» This represents $5,600.00 in special 
damages plus interest at 8% for 4 years and general damages in the 
amount of $87,500.00. 
oo;;'o?) 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
That Plaintiff James D. Ericksen recover costs and disbursements 
taxes in the sum of ** bTX . 
1991 
JUD/3E ^pj THE DIS^ICjP COURT 
Judgement is hereby entered in favor of the Plaintiff against 
the Defendants in Third District Court in the County of Salt Lake, 
Book no. , on page no. , on , 1991. 
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/ L 8ALTLAKgCOUW# 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
aUoMsn JAMES D. ERICKSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION 
and SALT LAKE AIRPORT AUTHORITY 
CASE NO. C88-637 
JUDGEMENT ON SPECIAL 
VERDICT 
Defendants. 
oooOooo 
This action came on for trial before the Court and a jury, 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, District Judge, presiding, and the 
issues having been duly tried and the jury having duly rendered its 
verdict, 
It is Ordered and Adjudged that the plaintiff James D. 
Ericksen recover of the defendant, Salt Lake City Corporation, Salt 
Lake Airport Authority, and each of them, the sum of $ ff H„ $ f2?~ 
with interest thereon at the rate of j%q* percent as provided 
by law, and his costs of action. 
# • 
oo;i?i 
Dated at JSL^D , Utah, this day of 
)Opk . 1991 « . 
Clerk of Court U 
00272 
EXHIBIT 2 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following Statutes are reproduced in full below. 
1. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent 
act or omission of employee -- Exception. Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-10(4) (1991 J.1 Failure to make 
an inspection or by making an inadequate or 
negligent inspection; 
2. Exclusive remedy against employer, or officer, 
agent or employee — Occupational disease excepted. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60 (1987). The right to 
recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of 
this title for injuries sustained by an employee, 
whether resulting in death or not, shall be the 
exclusive remedy against the employer and shall be 
the exclusive remedy against any officer, agent or 
employee of the employer and the liabilities of the 
employer imposed by this act shall be in place of 
any and all other civil liability whatsoever, at 
common law or otherwise, to such employee or to his 
spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, next 
of kin, heirs, personal representatives, guardian, 
or any other person whomsoever, on account of any 
accident or injury or death, in any way contracted, 
sustained, aggravated or incurred by such employee 
in the course of or because of or arising out of 
his employment, and no action at law may be 
maintained against an employer or against any 
officer, agent or employee of the employer based 
upon any accident injury or death of an employee. 
Nothing in this section, however, shall prevent an 
employee (or his dependents) from filing a claim 
with the industrial commission of Utah for 
compensation in those cases within the provisions 
of the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Act, as 
amended. 
3. Utah Liability Reform Act: Definitions. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-37 (1991). (1) "Defendant" means any 
person not immune from suit who is claimed to be 
liable because of fault to any person seeking 
recovery. (3) "Person seeking recovery" means any 
person seeking damages or reimbursement on its own 
behalf, or on behalf of another for whom it is 
authorized to act as legal representative. 
4. Comparative Negligence. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-
38(1991). The fault of a person seeking recovery 
shall not alone bar recovery by that person. He 
1
 formerly § 63-30-10(1)(d). 
may recover from any defendant or group of 
defendants whose fault exceeds his own. However, 
no defendant is liable to any person seeking 
recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion 
of fault attributable to that defendant. 
Separate special verdicts on total damages and 
proportion of fault. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-
39(1991). The trial court may, and when requested 
by any party shall, direct the jury, if any, to 
find separate special verdicts determining the 
total amount of damages sustained and the 
percentage or proportion of fault attributable to 
each person seeking recovery and to each defendant. 
Amount of liability limited to proportion of fault 
— No contribution. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-
40(1991). Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum 
amount for which a defendant may be liable to any 
person seeking recovery is that percentage or 
proportion of the damages equivalent to the 
percentage or proportion of fault attributed to 
that defendant. No defendant is entitled to 
contribution from any other person. 
Joinder of defendants. Utah Code Ann. §78-27-
41(1991). A person seeking recovery, or any 
defendant who is a party to the litigation, may 
join as parties any defendants who may have caused 
or contributed to the injury or damage for which 
recovery is sought, for the purpose of having 
determined their respective proportions of fault. 
Release to one defendant does not discharge other 
defendants. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-42(1991). A 
release given by a person seeking recovery to one 
or more defendants does not discharge any other 
defendant unless the release so provides. 
Effect on immunity, exclusive remedy, indemnity, 
contribution. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-43 (1991). 
Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 
affects or impairs any common law or statutory 
immunity from liability, including, but not limited 
to, governmental immunity as provided in Chapter 
30, Title 63, and the exclusive remedy provisions 
of Chapter 1, Title 35. Nothing in Sections 78-27-
37 through 78-27-42 affects or impairs any right to 
indemnity or contribution arising from statute, 
contract, or agreement. 
